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Abstract— Increasing numbers of software vulnerabilities are
discovered every year whether they are reported publicly or
discovered internally in proprietary code. These vulnerabilities
can pose serious risk of exploit and result in system compromise,
information leaks, or denial of service. We leveraged the wealth
of C and C++ open-source code available to develop a large-
scale function-level vulnerability detection system using machine
learning. To supplement existing labeled vulnerability datasets,
we compiled a vast dataset of millions of open-source functions
and labeled it with carefully-selected findings from three different
static analyzers that indicate potential exploits. The labeled
dataset is available at: https://osf.io/d45bw/. Using these datasets,
we developed a fast and scalable vulnerability detection tool based
on deep feature representation learning that directly interprets
lexed source code. We evaluated our tool on code from both
real software packages and the NIST SATE IV benchmark
dataset. Our results demonstrate that deep feature representation
learning on source code is a promising approach for automated
software vulnerability detection.
Index Terms—artificial neural networks, computer security,
data mining, machine learning
I. INTRODUCTION
Hidden flaws in software can result in security vulnera-
bilities that potentially allow attackers to compromise sys-
tems and applications. Thousands of such vulnerabilities are
reported publicly to the Common Vulnerabilities and Expo-
sures database [1] each year and many more are discov-
ered internally in proprietary code and patched. Recent high-
profile exploits have shown that these security holes can have
disastrous effects, both financially and societally [5]. These
vulnerabilities are often caused by subtle errors made by
programmers and can propagate quickly due to the prevalence
of open-source software and code reuse.
While there are existing tools for program analysis, these
tools typically only detect a limited subset of possible er-
rors based on pre-defined rules. With the recent widespread
availability of open-source repositories, it has become pos-
sible to use data-driven techniques to discover vulnerability
patterns. We present machine learning (ML) techniques for
*Correspondence to: rrussell@draper.com
†Tomo Lazovich now works at Lightmatter
the automated detection of vulnerabilities in C/C++1 source
code learned from real world code examples.
II. RELATED WORK
There currently exist a wide variety of analysis tools that
attempt to uncover common vulnerabilities in software. Static
analyzers, such as Clang [7], do so without needing to execute
programs. Dynamic analyzers repeatedly execute programs
with many test inputs on real or virtual processors to identify
weaknesses. Both static and dynamic analyzers are rule-based
tools and thus limited to their hand-engineered rules and not
able to guarantee full test coverage of codebases. Symbolic
execution [8] replaces input data with symbolic values and
analyzes their use over the control flow graph of a program.
While it can probe all feasible program paths, symbolic exe-
cution is expensive and does not scale well to large programs.
Beyond these traditional tools, there has been significant
recent work on the usage of machine learning for program
analysis. The availability of large amounts of open-source
code opens the opportunity to learn the patterns of software
vulnerabilities directly from mined data. For a comprehensive
review of learning from “Big Code”, including that not directly
related to our work, see Allamanis et al. [9].
In the area of vulnerability detection, Hovsepyan et al. [10]
used a support vector machine (SVM) on a bag-of-words
(BOW) representation of a simple tokenization of Java source
code to predict static analyzer labels. However, their work
was limited to training and evaluating on a single software
repository. Pang et al. [11] expanded on this work by including
n-grams in the feature vectors used with the SVM classifier.
Mou et al. [12] explored the potential of deep learning for
program analysis by embedding the nodes of the abstract
syntax tree representations of source code and training a
tree-based convolutional neural network for simple supervised
classification problems. Li et al. [13] used a recurrent neural
network (RNN) trained on code snippets related to library/API
function calls to detect two types of vulnerabilities related to
the improper usage of those calls. Harer et al. [14] trained
an RNN to detect vulnerabilities in the lexed representations
1While our work focuses on C/C++, the techniques are applicable to any
programming language.
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of functions in a synthetic codebase, as part of a generative
adversarial approach to code repair.
To our knowledge, no work has been done on using deep
learning to learn features directly from source code in a large
natural codebase to detect a variety of vulnerabilities. The
limited datasets (in both size and variety) used by most of
the previous works limit the usefulness of the results and
prevent them from taking full advantage of the power of deep
learning.
III. DATA
Given the complexity and variety of programs, a large
number of training examples are required to train machine
learning models that can effectively learn the patterns of
security vulnerabilities directly from code. We chose to an-
alyze software packages at the function-level because it is
the lowest level of granularity capturing the overall flow of a
subroutine. We compiled a vast dataset of millions of function-
level examples of C and C++ code from the SATE IV Juliet
Test Suite [6], Debian Linux distribution [15], and public Git
repositories on GitHub [16]. Table I shows the data summary
of the number of functions we collected and used from each
source in our dataset of over 12 million functions.
SATE IV GitHub Debian
Total 121,353 9,706,269 3,046,758
Passing curation 11,896 782,493 491,873
‘Not vulnerable’ 6,503 (55%) 730,160 (93%) 461,795 (94%)
‘Vulnerable’ 5,393 (45%) 52,333 (7%) 30,078 (6%)
TABLE I: Total number of functions obtained from each
data source, the number of valid functions remaining after
removing duplicates and applying cuts, and the number of
functions without and with detected vulnerabilities.
The SATE IV Juliet Test Suite contains synthetic code
examples with vulnerabilities from 118 different Common
Weakness Enumeration (CWE) [1] classes and was originally
designed to explore the performance of static and dynamic
analyzers. While the SATE IV dataset provides labeled exam-
ples of many types of vulnerabilities, it is made up of synthetic
code snippets that do not sufficiently cover the space of natural
code to provide an appropriate training set alone. To provide a
vast dataset of natural code to augment the SATE IV data, we
mined large numbers of functions from Debian packages and
public Git repositories. The Debian package releases provide
a selection of very well-managed and curated code which is
in use on many systems today. The GitHub dataset provides a
larger quantity and wider variety of (often lower-quality) code.
Since the open-source functions from Debian and GitHub are
not labeled, we used a suite of static analysis tools to generate
the labels. Details of the label generation are explained in
Subsection III-C.
A. Source lexing
To generate useful features from the raw source code of
each function, we created a custom C/C++ lexer designed to
capture the relevant meaning of critical tokens while keeping
the representation generic and minimizing the total token
vocabulary size. Making our lexed representation of code
from different software repositories as standardized as possible
empowers transfer learning across the full dataset. Standard
lexers, designed for actually compiling code, capture far too
much detail that can lead to overfitting in ML approaches.
Our lexer was able to reduce C/C++ code to representations
using a total vocabulary size of only 156 tokens. All base
C/C++ keywords, operators, and separators are included in
the vocabulary. Code that does not affect compilation, such
as comments, is stripped out. String, character, and float
literals are lexed to type-specific placeholder tokens, as are all
identifiers. Integer literals are tokenized digit-by-digit, as these
values are frequently relevant to vulnerabilities. Types and
function calls from common libraries that are likely to have
relevance to vulnerabilities are mapped to generic versions. For
example, u32, uint32_t, UINT32, uint32, and DWORD
are all lexed as the same generic token representing 32-bit
unsigned data types. Learned embeddings of these individual
tokens would likely distinguish them based on the kind of code
they are commonly used in, so care was taken to build in the
desired invariance.
B. Data curation
One very important step of our data preparation was
the removal of potential duplicate functions. Open-source
repositories often have functions duplicated across different
packages. Such duplication can artificially inflate performance
metrics and conceal overfitting, as training data can leak into
test sets. Likewise, there are many functions that are near
duplicates, containing trivial changes in source code that do
not significantly affect the execution of the function. These
near duplicates are challenging to remove, as they can often
appear in very different code repositories and can look quite
different at the raw source level.
To protect against these issues, we performed an extremely
strict duplicate removal process. We removed any function
with a duplicated lexed representation of its source code or
a duplicated compile-level feature vector. This compile-level
feature vector was created by extracting the control flow graph
of the function as well as the operations happening in each
basic block (opcode vector, or op-vec) and the definition and
use of variables (use-def matrix)2. Two functions with iden-
tical instruction-level behaviors or functionality are likely to
have both similar lexed representations and highly correlated
vulnerability status.
The “Passing curation” row of Table I reflects the number
of functions remaining after the duplicate removal process,
about 10.8% of the total number of functions pulled. Although
our strict duplicate removal process filters out a significant
amount of data, this approach provides the most conservative
2Our compile-level feature extraction framework incorporated modified
variants of strace and buildbot as well as a custom Clang plugin – we omit
the details to focus on the ML aspects of our work.
CWE ID CWE Description Frequency %
120/121/122 Buffer Overflow 38.2%
119 Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer 18.9%
476 NULL Pointer Dereference 9.5%
469 Use of Pointer Subtraction to Determine Size 2.0%
20, 457, 805 etc. Improper Input Validation, Use of Uninitialized Variable, Buffer Access with Incorrect Length Value, etc. 31.4%
TABLE II: CWE statistics of vulnerabilities detected in our C/C++ dataset.
performance results, closely estimating how well our tool will
perform against code it has never seen before.
C. Labels
Labeling code vulnerability at the function level was a
significant challenge. The bulk of our dataset was made up
of mined open-source code without known ground truth. In
order to generate labels, we pursued three approaches: static
analysis, dynamic analysis, and commit-message/bug-report
tagging.
While dynamic analysis is capable of exposing subtle flaws
by executing functions with a wide range of possible inputs, it
is extremely resource intensive. Performing a dynamic analysis
on the roughly 400 functions in a single module of the LibTIFF
3.8.2 package from the ManyBugs dataset [17] took nearly a
day of effort. Therefore, this approach was not realistic for
our extremely large dataset.
Commit-message based labeling turned out to be very
challenging, providing low-quality labels. In our tests, both
humans and ML algorithms were poor at using commit mes-
sages to predict corresponding Travis CI [18] build failures or
fixes. Motivated by recent work by Zhou et al. [19], we also
tried a simple keyword search looking for commit words like
“buggy”, “broken”, “error”, “fixed”, etc. to label before-and-
after pairs of functions, which yielded better results in terms of
relevancy. However, this approach greatly reduced the number
of candidate functions that we could label and still required
significant manual inspection, making it inappropriate for our
vast dataset.
As a result, we decided to use three open-source static ana-
lyzers, Clang, Cppcheck [20], and Flawfinder [21], to generate
labels. Each static analyzer varies in its scope of search and
detection. For example, Clang’s scope is very broad but also
picks up on syntax, programming style, and other findings
which are not likely to result in a vulnerability. Flawfinder’s
scope is geared towards CWEs and does not focus on other
aspects such as style. Therefore, we incorporated multiple
static analyzers and pruned their outputs to exclude findings
that are not typically associated with security vulnerabilities
in an effort to create robust labels.
We had a team of security researchers map each static
analyzer’s finding categories to the corresponding CWEs and
identify which CWEs would likely result in potential security
vulnerabilities. This process allowed us to generate binary
labels of “vulnerable” and “not vulnerable”, depending on the
CWE. For example, Clang’s “Out-of-bound array access” find-
ing was mapped to “CWE-805: Buffer Access with Incorrect
Length Value”, an exploitable vulnerability that can lead to
program crashes, so functions with this finding were labeled
“vulnerable”. On the other hand, Cppcheck’s “Unused struct
member” finding was mapped to “CWE-563: Assignment
to Variable without Use”, a poor code practice unlikely to
cause a security vulnerability, so corresponding functions were
labeled “not vulnerable” even though static analyzers flagged
them. Of the 390 total types of findings from the static
analyzers, 149 were determined to result in a potential security
vulnerability. Roughly 6.8% of our curated, mined C/C++
functions triggered a vulnerability-related finding. Table II
shows the statistics of frequent CWEs in these “vulnerable”
functions. All open-source function source codes from Debian
and GitHub with corresponding CWE labels are available here:
https://osf.io/d45bw/.
IV. METHODS
Our primary machine learning approach to vulnerability
detection, depicted in Figure 1, combines the neural feature
representations of lexed function source code with a powerful
ensemble classifier, random forest (RF).
A. Neural network classification and representation learning
Since source code shares some commonalities with writing
and work done for programming languages is more limited, we
build off approaches developed for natural language processing
(NLP) [22]. We leverage feature-extraction approaches similar
to those used for sentence sentiment classification with convo-
lutional neural networks (CNNs) and recurrent neural networks
(RNNs) for function-level source vulnerability classification.
1) Embedding: The tokens making up the lexed functions
are first embedded into a fixed k-dimensional representation
(limited to range [−1, 1]) that is learned during classification
training via backpropagation to a linear transformation of
a one-hot embedding. Several unsupervised word2vec ap-
proaches [23] trained on a much larger unlabeled dataset were
explored for seeding this embedding, but these yielded mini-
mal improvement in classification performance over randomly-
initialized learned embeddings. A fixed one-hot embedding
was also tried, but gave diminished results. As our vocabulary
size is much smaller than those of natural languages, we
were able to use a much smaller embedding than is typical
in NLP applications. Our experiments found that k = 13
performed the best for supervised embedding sizes, balanc-
ing the expressiveness of the embedding against overfitting.
We found that adding a small amount of random Gaussian
noise N (µ = 0, σ2 = 0.01) to each embedded representation
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Fig. 1: Illustration of our convolutional neural representation-learning approach to source code classification. Input source code
is lexed into a token sequence of variable length `, embedded into a ` × k representation, filtered by n convolutions of size
m× k, and maxpooled along the sequence length to a feature vector of fixed size n. The embedding and convolutional filters
are learned by weighted cross entropy loss from fully-connected classification layers. The learned n-dimensional feature vector
is used as input to a random forest classifier, which improves performance compared to the neural network classifier alone.
substantially improved resistance to overfitting and was much
more effective than other regularization techniques such as
weight decay.
2) Feature extraction: We explored both CNNs and RNNs
for feature extraction from the embedded source representa-
tions. Convolutional feature extraction: We use n convolu-
tional filters with shape m × k, so each filter spans the full
space of the token embedding. The filter size m determines the
number of sequential tokens that are considered together and
we found that a fairly large filter size of m = 9 worked best. A
total number of n = 512 filters, paired with batch normaliza-
tion followed by ReLU, was most effective. Recurrent feature
extraction: We also explored using recurrent neural networks
for feature extraction to allow longer token-dependencies to be
captured. The embedded representation is fed to a multi-layer
RNN and the output at each step in the length ` sequence is
concatenated. We used two-layer Gated Recurrent Unit RNNs
with hidden state size n′ = 256, though Long Short Term
Memory RNNs performed equally well.
3) Pooling: As the length of C/C++ functions found in
the wild can vary dramatically, both the convolutional and
recurrent features are maxpooled along the sequence length
` in order to generate a fixed-size (n or n′, respectively)
representation. In this architecture, the feature extraction layers
should learn to identify different signals of vulnerability and
thus the presence of any of these along the sequence is
important.
4) Dense layers: The feature extraction layers are followed
by a fully-connected classifier. 50% dropout on the maxpooled
feature representation connections to the first hidden layer was
used when training. We found that using two hidden layers of
64 and 16 before the final softmax output layer gave the best
classification performance.
5) Training: For data batching convenience, we trained
only on functions with token length 10 ≤ ` ≤ 500, padded
to the maximum length of 500. Both the convolutional and
recurrent networks were trained with batch size 128, Adam
optimization (with learning rates 5 × 10−4 and 1 × 10−4,
respectively), and with a cross entropy loss. Since the dataset
was strongly unbalanced, vulnerable functions were weighted
more heavily in the loss function. This weight is one of the
many hyper-parameters we tuned to get the best performance.
We used a 80:10:10 split of our SATE IV, Debian, and GitHub
combined dataset to train, validate, and test our models. We
tuned and selected models based on the highest validation
Matthews Correlation Coefficient (MCC).
B. Ensemble learning on neural representations
While the neural network approaches automatically build
their own features, their classification performance on our
full dataset was suboptimal. We found that using the neural
features (outputs from the sequence-maxpooled convolution
layer in the CNN and sequence-maxpooled output states in
the RNN) as inputs to a powerful ensemble classifier such as
random forest or extremely randomized trees yielded the best
results on our full dataset. Having the features and classifier
optimized separately seemed to help resist overfitting. This
approach also makes it more convenient to quickly retrain a
classifier on new sets of features or combinations of features.
V. RESULTS
To provide a strong benchmark, we trained an RF classifier
on a “bag-of-words” (BOW) representation of function source
code, which ignores the order of the tokens. An examination of
the bag-of-words feature importances shows that the classifier
exploits label correlations with (1) indicators of the source
length and complexity and (2) combinations of calls which
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Fig. 2: Precision versus recall of different ML approaches
using our lexer representation on Debian and Github test data.
Vulnerable functions make up 6.5% of the test data.
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Fig. 3: SATE IV test data ROC, with true vulnerability
labels, compared to the three static analyzers we considered.
Vulnerable functions make up 43% of the test data.
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Fig. 4: Performance of a multi-label CNN + RF classifier on
Debian and Github data by vulnerability type (see Table II.)
are commonly misused and lead to vulnerabilities (such as
memcpy and malloc.) Improvements over this baseline can
be interpreted as being due to more complex and specific
vulnerability indication patterns.
Overall, our CNN models performed better than the RNN
models as both standalone classifiers and feature generators.
In addition, the CNNs were faster to train and required much
fewer parameters. On our natural function dataset, the RF
classifier trained on neural feature representations performed
better than the standalone network for both the CNN and RNN
features. Likewise, the RF classifiers trained on neural network
representations performed better than the benchmark BOW
classifier.
Figure 2 shows the precision-recall performance of the best
PR AUC ROC AUC MCC F1
BOW + RF 0.459 0.883 0.462 0.498
RNN 0.465 0.896 0.501 0.532
CNN 0.467 0.897 0.509 0.540
RNN + RF 0.498 0.899 0.523 0.552
CNN + RF 0.518 0.904 0.536 0.566
TABLE III: Results on the Debian and GitHub test data for
our ML models, corresponding to Figure 2.
PR AUC ROC AUC MCC F1
Clang – – 0.227 0.450
Flawfinder – – 0.079 0.365
Cppcheck – – 0.060 0.050
BOW + RF 0.890 0.913 0.607 0.786
RNN 0.900 0.923 0.646 0.807
CNN 0.944 0.954 0.698 0.840
RNN + RF 0.914 0.934 0.657 0.813
CNN + RF 0.916 0.936 0.672 0.824
TABLE IV: Results on the SATE IV Juliet Suite test data for
our ML models and three static analyzers, as in Figure 3.
versions of all of the primary ML approaches on our natural
function test dataset. The area under the precision-recall curve
(PR AUC) and receiver operating characteristic (ROC AUC)
as well as the MCC and F1 score at the validation-optimal
thresholds are shown in Table III. Figure 4 shows the perfor-
mance of our strongest classifier when trained to detect specific
vulnerability types from a shared feature representation. Some
CWE types are significantly more challenging than others.
We compare our ML models against our collection of
SA tools on SATE IV Juliet Suite dataset, which has true
vulnerability labels. Figure 3 shows the performance of our
models alongside the SA findings on this nearly label-balanced
Fig. 5: Screenshot from our interactive vulnerability detection
demo. The convolutional feature activation map [24] for a
detected vulnerability is overlaid in red on the original code.
dataset. We find that our models, especially the CNN, perform
much better on the SATE IV test data than on the natural
functions from Debian and GitHub, likely because SATE IV
has many examples for each vulnerability it contains and has
fairly consistent style and structure. Among the SA tools,
Clang performs the best on the SATE IV data, but still finds
very few vulnerabilities compared with all of the ML methods.
The full SATE IV results are shown in Table IV.
Our ML methods have some additional advantages over
traditional static analysis tools. Our custom lexer and ML
models can rapidly digest and score large repositories and
source code without requiring that the code be compiled.
Additionally, since the ML methods all output probabilities,
the thresholds can be tuned to achieve the desired precision
and recall. The static analyzers on the other hand return a fixed
number of findings, which may be overwhelmingly large for
huge codebases or too small for critical applications. While
static analyzers are able to better localize the vulnerabilities
they find, we can use visualization techniques, such as the
feature activation map shown in Figure 5, to help understand
why our algorithms make their decisions.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
We have demonstrated the potential of using ML to detect
software vulnerabilities directly from source code. To do
this, we built an extensive C/C++ source code dataset mined
from Debian and GitHub repositories, labeled with curated
vulnerability findings from a suite of static analysis tools,
and combined it with the SATE IV dataset. We created a
custom C/C++ lexer to create a simple, generic representation
of function source code ideal for ML training. We applied a
variety of ML techniques inspired by classification problems
in the natural language domain, fine-tuned them for our
application, and achieved the best overall results using features
learned via convolutional neural network and classified with
an ensemble tree algorithm.
Future work should focus on improved labels, such as those
from dynamic analysis tools or mined from security patches.
This would allow scores produced from the ML models to
be more complementary with static analysis tools. The ML
techniques developed in this work for learning directly on
function source code can also be applied to any code clas-
sification problem, such as detecting style violations, commit
categorization, or algorithm/task classification. As larger and
better-labeled datasets are developed, deep learning for source
code analysis will become more practical for a wider variety
of important problems.
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